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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MAKING HEALTH MARKETS WORK BETTER THROUGH
TARGETED DOSES OF COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND
COLLABORATION
LEN M. NICHOLS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some thoughtful commentators have argued that many health services,
including insurance, are so unique and vital to the health of so many that
they should not be bought and sold in markets like other goods and
services.1 Their judgment is that markets inevitably lead to some—and
possibly a considerable—degree of rationing by income, at least in the
context of the United States’ health system until 2014, when the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is scheduled to be more fully
implemented.2 Rationing by income is judged to be inherently unjust, since
life itself, as well as profound differences in the quality of life, are at stake so
often. Those who reason this way would largely or completely replace
market allocation mechanisms with expert allocation mechanisms.3 They
would turn health professionals into employees of the federal government,
and “ensure” that all (Americans) get the care they “need” through systems

* Director, Center for Health Policy Research and Ethics, and Professor of Health Policy,
College of Health and Human Services, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.
1. Bruce C. Vladeck, Perspective: Market Realities Meet Balanced Government: Another
Look At Columbia/HCA, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 37, 39; PNHP Mission Statement,
PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/about/pnhp-mission-state
ment (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 126
(Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996).
2. Single-Payer FAQ, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/
facts/single-payer-faq (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); see Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1003-399V-3, 124 Stat. 119, 139, 150, 151, 159, 162, 998
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-94-1395x). The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), was amended by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029. The two preceding laws will be hereinafter cited together as “ACA.”
3. PNHP Mission Statement, supra note 1; Single-Payer FAQ, supra note 2.
7
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of professionally driven logic, control, and governmental supply, financed
largely if not exclusively by taxes on the general population.4
Others argue that the allocation of taxpayer-funded resources by experts
would inevitably lead to health care rationing by politics, which they view not
only as inherently unjust, but also un-American and unconstitutional, and
which at the end of the day is the same thing in their eyes.5 They cannot
imagine a worse outcome than divorcing the allocation of health resources
from the marketplace, for they believe consumers have the inalienable right
to buy what they want with their own money—whether others want to tax it
away or make them spend it differently [or not].6 They also believe that if
you cannot afford to buy what you want or need with your own money, you
have no right to expect those with more means to help you, except through
voluntary and preferably local charity.7
As we have (painfully) observed, now twice in twenty years, the epic
battles over health reform in the United States, based as they are on
fundamentally different views of the role of government in a democratic
republic, have led to partisan polarization, apocalyptic rhetoric, and
genuine fear.8 I write this article not to praise fear, but to bury it, by
describing how to amend health market rules in such a way as to preserve
key freedoms and personal choice while improving the distributive justice,
economic efficiency, and ultimately sustainability of universal access to vital
health services. It turns out that health reform and true economic efficiency
can be complementary. It also turns out that the ACA provides some, but by
no means all, of the tools to improve market performance in a host of
circumstances. The purpose of this article is to identify these circumstances
and match them with specific tools. Although this article cannot reconcile
those who oppose any collective role in making sure all Americans have
4. PNHP Mission Statement, supra note 1; Single-Payer FAQ, supra note 2; About CNA,
CAL. NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/affiliates/entry/cna-about (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011).
5. Ilya Shapiro, The Individual Mandate: An Unconstitutional Expansion of Federal Power
(A Reply to Kermit Roosevelt), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2011/09/individual-mandate-unconstitutional-expansionfederal-power-reply-kermit-roosevelt/; Michael F. Cannon, How Can I Ration Your Medical
Care?, TOWNHALL MAG., Sept. 2009, at 50, 51-54.
6. Cannon, supra note 5, at 52, 54; Michael F. Cannon, A “Right” to Health Care?,
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 29, 2007, 6:00 AM) [hereinafter Cannon, A “Right” to Health
Care?], http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/221410/right-health-care/michael-f-cannon.
7. Cannon, A “Right” to Health Care?, supra note 6; Leonard Peikoff, Health Care Is
Not a Right, Address at a Town Hall Meeting on the Clinton Health Plan 1, 2 (Dec. 11,
1993), available at http://afcm.org/Health-Care-Is-Not-A-Right_(c)-Leonard-Peikoff.pdf.
8. Health Care Reform, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/dis
easesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_care/health_care_reform/in
dex. html (last updated Nov. 15, 2011).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011

MAKING HEALTH MARKETS WORK BETTER

9

access to care, I can perhaps show that actual market performance—in
terms of prices closer to cost and cost growth closer to our limited ability to
pay—could be substantially improved from wise and more widespread
applications of market-savvy policy tools.
I will try to answer four questions: (1) What do we want health markets
to do? (2) What are the major barriers to achieving optimal performance?
(3) Under what conditions can each policy approach (laissez-faire,
collaboration, regulation) improve current market outcomes? (4) What
additional tools, beyond those in the ACA, are desperately needed to get us
closer to the promised land?
II. MARKET DESIDERATA
The fundamental criterion of economically efficient market performance
(competitive equilibrium) is for consumers to be willing to pay what they
have to pay to cover the marginal social cost of producing what the
consumer wants. Under conditions that are assumed to prevail in
competitive markets, this maximizes the value of society’s resource
allocation. Technically, economists want price (P) to be driven down to the
efficient unit cost level (C*), where cost includes a competitive return on the
minimally necessary capital investment. This is not the same thing as
“maximizing the number of competitors,” or creating a “business friendly”
environment, though that rhetoric is popular and those structural conditions
may improve market performance if barriers to entry have been high for
some time. But if price is neither near nor moving rapidly toward the unit
cost of efficient providers, something is seriously wrong with market
performance, regardless of how happy sellers might be.9
Another signal of allocative efficiency is whether the quantity (q) of
services is optimal (q*). This is defined as the quantity where efficient
marginal cost equals price, where price reflects what a fully informed
consumer would pay and an efficient provider would require to cover the
costs of the last unit, i.e., where marginal value equals efficient marginal
cost. In the health care context, q* is all the services needed to ensure
efficacious care for a particular condition and no more.
Quality (Q) of each unit or of the set of units delivered is typically
ignored in textbook economics, since it is assumed that producers of the q*
will naturally supply consumers with the optimal quality (Q*) that they are,
being fully informed about the marginal value of true quality, willing to pay
for. Thus, quality should be supplied to balance value and cost, just like
quantity. Quality is more complicated than it seems, for part of good quality

9. See Len M. Nichols et al., Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health
Care Systems? Confidence Is Waning, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 8, 12.
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is the correct set of quantities, the q, but quality goes beyond that to include
patient experience. It is not just what is done to or with a patient, but how it
is done, that defines quality health care in the 21st century.
Finally, in the real world, many people prefer some degree of equity in
access to health markets, which could be expressed as all (Americans) will
get minimally necessary q* and Q* to preserve their capacity to work and
live a normal life. Support for universal equity is clearly not unanimous, but
it is real and powerful enough to be highly relevant to practical and policy
discussions of health market performance.
III. HEALTH MARKET REALITIES
None of these desired outcomes are met in most health markets today.
Given the margins and cost growth performances that have been observed
for many years, I infer that market prices are often far above unit costs (P >
C).10 Technically, this is both because providers are not efficient (C > C*)11
and because local market power enables many to charge private payers
(and sometimes government payers) more than C.12 Provider market power
is amplified when insurers, starting with the largest one for most hospitals
and physicians—the Medicare program—are compelled by politics,
tradition, or in the absence of credible information on differential provider
quality, feel compelled to provide access to practically any willing
provider.13 Rather than negotiate the more than 10,000 medical service
prices with approximately 700,000 doctors and 6,000 hospitals, they set

10. In the understated elegance of Joe Newhouse’s historical explanation of provider
prices in the U.S. health care system: “Thus, the standard market mechanisms for eliminating
rents—or prices above average cost—were weak in the market for medical services, and did
not operate at all in the limiting case of insurance that reimbursed patients in full at the
margin.” JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 11
(2002).
11. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, SECTION 3B:
PHYSICIAN SERVICES 114 (2004); The Overuse, Underuse, and Misuse of Health Care: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) [hereinafter Misuse of Health Care]
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
12. Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and Physicians Shift the Effects of Cuts in Medicare
Reimbursement to Private Payers?, HEALTH AFF., w3-472, w3-474, w3-477-78 (Oct. 8, 2003)
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/10/08/hlthaff.w3.472.full.pdf; James C.
Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in Orthopedic Surgery and
Interventional Cardiology, AM. J. MANAGED CARE, e241, e247 (June 2011), http://www.aj
mc.com/media/pdf/86aee848e56115f8d8d43711599ce6ef.pdf.
13. Robert A. Berenson & Jane Horvath, Confronting The Barriers To Chronic Care
Management In Medicine, HEALTH AFF., w3-37, w3-42 (Jan. 22, 2003) http://www.healthaff
airs.org/RWJ/Berenson.pdf; MEDPAC, supra note 11, at 109.
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administered price schedules that ensure most are willing to participate.14
This, by definition, means that most prices exceed the reservation price or
unit cost for most providers.
At the same time, endemic process
inefficiencies, Medicaid underpayment, and uncompensated care for the
under- and uninsured, especially for hospitals, keep overall margins low.
This complex set of facts, which also includes prices a bit higher than costs,
costs higher than need be, as well as small and variable margins on large
cash flows, defines the conundrum of incentive realignment in U.S. health
care.
Finally, there is quite a bit of evidence that q > q* for many patients and
conditions.15 Again, technically this is because the incentives for overuse
are strong: providers make more money from doing more,16
consumers/patients often face low or zero marginal cost from more and
more expensive services,17 and fear of malpractice claims18 and anxiety
about possible maladies leads to far more testing and procedures than
necessary.19
While we have some of the best clinicians and hospitals in the world—
and indeed perform very well vis-a-vis the rest of the world in complex
domains (heart attacks, some surgeries),20—our providers also have highly
variable skill and knowledge and do a far worse job than many other
countries’ systems in consistently delivering high quality primary and chronic
care management.21 This is where most of the money is actually spent and
most of the health care system’s value-added to population health actually

14. MEDPAC, supra note 11, at 109; Misuse of Health Care, supra note 11, at 7; BUREAU
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: PHYSICIANS
AND SURGEONS 3 (2010-2011 ed. 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos
074.pdf; Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/overview.aspx (last updated Sept.
30, 2011); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Total Hospitals, 2009, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=382&cat=8 (last visited Oct. 8,
2011); Data Compendium: 2010 Edition, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/DataCompendium/14_2010_Data_Com
pendium.asp#TopOfPage (last updated Oct. 27, 2011).
15. Misuse of Health Care, supra note 11, at 2, 7.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Tara F. Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on Defensive Medicine: A National Survey,
170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081 (2010).
19. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending In The United States And The Rest Of The
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 910 (2005).
20. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2009, at 123, 125,
129 (2009) [hereinafter OECD]; Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does The Quality Of Care
Compare In Five Countries?, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2004, at 89, 92.
21. See OECD, supra note 20, at 117, 119, 121.
OF LABOR
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occurs.22 This means our average quality is far below what it should be
(Q < Q*) far too often.23 In addition, our lack of equitable access to care
exacerbates average quality gaps.24
More fundamental reasons for suboptimal health market performance
include the reality that health care is a complex multi-product industry where
inherent uncertainty is great. This is the case because humans are not all
alike, and accurate diagnosis can require very subtle powers of discernment.
This process is not like buying apples or tomatoes that you can hold and
evaluate before purchase. Inherent uncertainty and the contingent nature of
illness means that even after purchase, many consumers will never know
how effective the health insurance or health services they purchased actually
were.
Furthermore, asymmetric information about health and health care
services between buyers and sellers means that patients will always depend
on providers for technical advice and more or less have to trust that
providers are at all times duty bound to act and advise in the patient’s best
interest.25 This reality, plus third party payment26—itself a requirement in the
modern world of potentially catastrophic expenses that can bankrupt all but
the richest citizens—means that providers are constantly tempted to err on
the side of more versus fewer services in pursuit of the patient’s “best
interest,” especially given lingering (if sometimes quantitatively
exaggerated)27 malpractice concerns. And as long as fee-for-service
payment remains the norm, some providers will be sorely tempted to provide
more services than needed, as any other seller in conditions of asymmetric
information would be.28 Some providers do resist this temptation. But there
is growing evidence that the self-deniers are on the verge of being
outnumbered in American medicine today,29 even if the primary motivation
22. U.S. Health Care Costs, KAISEREDU.ORG (March 2010), http://www.kaiseredu.org/
Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx#content6.
23. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2010 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2 (2011).
24. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED. (IOM), CROSSING THE
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (2001).
25. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 949-50 (1963); see Peter J. Hammer et al., Kenneth Arrow and the
Changing Economics of Health Care: “Why Arrow? Why Now?”, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
835, 836, 841 (2001).
26. Arrow, supra note 25, at 962.
27. See Anderson et al., supra note 19, at 910, 912.
28. See id. at 910.
29. See Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare
Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
273, 276 (2003); Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at
36, 40, 42.
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is less venal than defensive, and even deeply symbiotic with declining
professional morale in an era of unmet expectations of autonomy and
prestige.30
In other words, asymmetric information and third-party payment leads to
too many services and too much spending. In addition, local market power
leads to prices being higher than efficient unit cost, both from pricing power
and from the absence of incentives and market dynamics that require
providers to reduce cost to the minimum. Indeed, of all the fundamental
problems in health markets, the absence of strong self-correcting
mechanisms is the most troubling. Entry and accurate quality information
are theoretically (and often empirically) sufficient to improve most markets’
performance over time, but health markets and relationships with
sympathetic but self-interested, providers are so complex that credible
information that less care can often be better care is not readily or widely
accepted. Instead, market “entry” of providers, or higher supply in more
desirable locations (where income and life style opportunities are higher)
has been shown time and time again to lead to supply-induced demand for
certain kinds of preference-sensitive care.31 All these forces together lead to
per capita health care cost growth which exceeds economy-wide productivity
growth (and thus real income growth potential) by 2-3% per annum.32 Over
time this is the main threat to middle class access to coverage and care (the
uninsured now exceed 50 million and continue to grow)33 as well as the
main structural imbalance in public budgets at the federal, state, and local
levels.34 We cannot and should not be satisfied with health market
performance in the status quo.
IV. POLICY TOOLS
There are three types of tools available to policy makers to affect market
performance: (1) competition-promotion, (2) regulation or structured
competition, and (3) collaboration-facilitation. The key question is not
whether health markets actually satisfy the conditions of perfect competition.
Few markets actually do, up close. The relevant question is, can policy

30. Hoangmai H. Pham et al., Financial Pressures Spur Physician Entrepreneurialism,
HEALTH AFF., Mar./ Apr. 2004 at 70, 79-80.
31. Fisher, supra note 29, at 286.
32. VICTOR R. FUCHS, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF: THE
FUTURE OF MANAGED CARE 2 (2000); see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM
BUDGET OUTLOOK 35, 42 (2011) [hereinafter CBO LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK].
33. CBO LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 32, at 36.
34. Id. at 35, 43; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-496SP, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS’ FISCAL OUTLOOK 3 (Apr. 2011).
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changes actually improve health market performance over the current status
quo? I answer this question for each set of tools in turn.
A.

Competition-promotion

The concept of “first, do no harm,” at least as old as the Hippocratic
Oath, should also be applied to policies governing health markets because
many of the deviations from optimal performance are the fault of policy,
law, and regulation, which often is the result of pursuing non-market goals
with health policy tools that happened to be convenient. The simplest
competition-promoting policy to consider then is laissez-faire,35 which in the
health care context entails reductions in regulation or legislative barriers to
market freedom and competitive performance.
There are at least three types of cases where more laissez-faire should
be tried:
When quality regulations are redundant and increase cost. One
example stems from lack of coordination of payers performing quality audits
on hospitals. A given hospital may be inspected on site by teams from
Medicare, Medicaid, the U.S. Department of Defense, private insurers, the
Joint Commission, as well as state, county and city governments, all looking
for the very same quality and safety performance metrics.36 But each visit
takes substantial documentation and senior-plus-mid-management time.37
Coordination among quality regulators could save time, money, and
improve quality by allowing senior management to devote more time to
improving it rather than so much redundant time proving compliance with
regulations.
When the law itself is the barrier to efficiency. The classic cases here are
scope of practice restrictions that are not evidence-based. The recent
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) report on nursing compiled, yet again, the
overwhelming evidence that nurse practitioners are perfectly capable of
delivering very high percentages of the primary care needs of the general
population, but many state legislatures, under pressure from local medical
societies, refuse to grant scope of practice privileges commensurate with
35. Laissez-faire, literally “let do” in French, more generally is used by economists to
mean free from policy intervention. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (9th ed. 2009). It is
important to note, if only in passing, that no market activity is possible without a governmental
authority defining and enforcing property rights and contracts, so the idea of “markets without
government altogether” is a myth, however enduring and alluring it may be in some
ideological camps.
36. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 159-94 (6th ed. 2008) (overviewing the
different private and public entities that inspect hospitals).
37. See Eligibility for Hospital and Critical Access Hospital Accreditation, THE JOINT
COMMISSION (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.jointcommission.org/eligibility_hospital_cah_accred
itation/.
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their training and experience and the best available clinical evidence.38 This
is also true for many other health professions, like psychologists,
optometrists, nurse anesthetists, nurse midwives, pharmacists, etc.39
Another example of far-from-perfect current law is patent law for
pharmaceuticals. Patents are unquestionably necessary to spur innovation,
especially in markets where the innovation is knowledge, and therefore
easily transferable once known.40 Without government-granted patent/
monopoly protection, there would be far less innovation than we observe
today. At the same time, granting a patent conveys monopoly power on the
patent holder, so this raises prices and costs to others, necessitating a
balance of competing interests, or a tradeoff.41 This is the main reason that
in the United States, patent life is limited. In 1995, patent life for all
products was increased from seventeen to twenty years,42 but in PhRMA’s
case, this is misleading, since the patent clock starts ticking when the
intellectual properties of the new compound are filed, not when the drug is
approved by the FDA for sale.43 The drug testing and then the formal FDA
approval process, while necessary to assure efficacy and safety, can take
eight to twelve years,44 which shortens the effective patent life to twelve to
eight years. The shortened monopoly period to effectively recoup the costs
of research and development and reward the investment and risk surely
leads to higher brand name drug prices than might otherwise be the case.
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman legislation attempted to balance the
38. INST. OF MED. (IOM), THE FUTURE OF NURSING: FOCUS ON SCOPE OF PRACTICE 2
(2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2010/The-Future-ofNursing/Nursing%20Scope%20of%20Practice%202010%20Brief.pdf.
39. See REBECCA LEBUHN & DAVID A. SWANKIN, CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., REFORMING
SCOPES OF PRACTICE 3, 4, 15 (2010), available at https://www.ncsbn.org/ReformingScopesof
Practice-WhitePaper.pdf.
40. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY NO. 3, at 783, 787-88 (1987),
available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/2534454.
41. JEAN O. LANJOUW, ECON. GROWTH CTR., YALE UNIV., CTR. DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 775,
THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN INDIA: “HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF
THE POOR AND SUFFERING”? 4 (1997), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp
775.pdf.
42. It had been set at seventeen years since Thomas Jefferson was president. See 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (demonstrating the change in U.S. patent life
from seventeen to twenty years).
43. See MERRILL MATHEWS JR., INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, FROM INCEPTION TO
INGESTION: THE COST OF CREATING NEW DRUGS (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://ipi.org/ipi/
IPIPublications.nsf/0/4a4dae090d22a1d886256c38005da8d9/$FILE/II-CostofnewDrugs3.pdf.
44. CAL. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ASS’N, FACT SHEET: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS,
available at http://ca-biomed.org/pdf/media-kit/fact-sheets/CBRADrugDevelop.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20, 2011).
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competing objectives of encouraging new and more effective drugs with
price competition from generics once patent protection expires, by allowing
speedy approval of generics at the FDA while granting up to an additional
five years of exclusivity—monopoly—to patent holders, once their patent
had expired.45 Economic analysis suggests that this effectively extended the
average effective life of drug patents by two to three years.46
Furthermore, to extend the time of high profits accruing in the postapproval patent protection period, name brand manufacturers have
regularly filed nuisance lawsuits strategically near the time of patent
expiration to challenge generic manufacturers’ products because the suit
alone freezes FDA approval of generics for thirty months.47 In retaliation,
generic manufacturers have countersued.48 Clearly, all this litigious effort
could have been diverted to developing new drugs rather than fighting over
the monopoly profits of old ones. The ACA contribution to current drug
monopoly law extended the Hatch-Waxman post-patent exclusivity period
from five to twelve years for biologics,49 the most important class of new
drugs in the twenty-first century, but promises to end the peri-expiration
lawsuit games in as yet unspecified ways.50 This provision was the result of
complicated political bargaining that, like the original Hatch-Waxman
compromise, did not benefit from state-of-the-art unbiased economic
analysis.51
Optimal patent life is a relatively new area of research that is by no
means settled into agreed upon and easily measurable formulae, but one

45. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1538, 1589, 1590 (1984).
46. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109 (2000).
47. Greater Access to Generic Drugs: New FDA Initiatives to Improve the Drug Review
Process and Reduce Legal Loopholes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143545.htm; see CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 41 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftp
docs/6xx/doc 655/pharm.pdf.
48. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 44 n.13 (July 2002) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrug
study.pdf (outlining generic and brand name drug manufacturer patent suits).
49. ACA § 7002(a) (amending PHSA § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262).
50. ACA § 7002(c)(1) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)).
51. See Paul Blumenthal, The Legacy of Billy Tauzin: The White House-PhRMA Deal,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/02/
12/the-legacy-of-billy-tauzin-the-white-house-phrma-deal; Emily K. Strunk, Debate Over
Exclusivity in Biologics Provision of PPACA Heats Up, HEALTH REFORM RES. CTR., AKIN GUMP
STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, http://aghealthreform.com/2011/02/14/debate-over-exclusivityin-biologics-provision-of-ppaca-heats-up/ (last visited Oct. 4 2011).
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overarching conclusion seems clear: effective patent length should be set
based on technological and financial realities of individual markets, not
“one length fits all” as under current law. The post-ACA exclusivity period
lengthens effective patent life for biologic pharmaceuticals back to and even
beyond the twenty years of current U.S. patent law for all products except
pharmaceuticals.52 It is hard to believe that this time frame appropriately
balances our competing priorities of encouraging innovation and universal
access to affordable high quality care. Analytic re-examination of the rules
for new and competing pharmaceutical approval and exclusivity would seem
to be a public policy priority of the highest order.
The third area where retreating from existing legal restrictions on market
competition could improve market performance might be generally
described as when emotion or nostalgia creates a protected class of
providers. Due to political pressure from rural members of Congress and a
general sense that rural America needs and deserves federal help to sustain
its unique way of life,53 Medicare has designated roughly 1300 rural
hospitals as Critical Access Hospitals (“CAHs”),54 over 430 hospitals as sole
community providers (“SCPs”)55 and 140 as Medicare dependent hospitals
(“MDHs”).56 Any of these designations entitles the hospital to some form of
cost-based reimbursement rather than prospective payment levels pegged to
average degrees of efficiency across the hospital industry.57 These hospitals
all have fewer than 100 beds (most fewer than twenty-five) and about 20%
of them are more than thirty-five miles from alternative sources of
emergency care.58 Since only about 20% of the US population still lives in
rural areas, and some of them seek acute care in urban areas, these
hospitals account for only 15% of Medicare’s total inpatient spending.59

52. ACA § 7002(g) (amending PHSA § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262).
53. See Council of Econ. Advisers, Strengthening the Rural Economy—The Current State
of Rural America, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/fact
sheets-reports/strengthening-the-rural-economy/the-current-state-of-rural-america (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
54. Critical Access Hospitals Payment Systems, MEDPAC.GOV, http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_09_CAH.pdf (last updated Oct. 2009).
55. Sole Community Hospitals, TRICARE MGMT., http://www.tricare.mil/hospitalclassifica
tion/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
56. G. MARK HOLMES ET AL., N.C. RURAL HEALTH RES. & POL’Y ANALYSIS CTR., FINAL REP. NO.
98, A COMPARISON OF RURAL HOSPITALS WITH SPECIAL MEDICARE PAYMENT PROVISIONS TO URBAN
AND RURAL HOSPITALS PAID UNDER PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 10 (2010); see also 42 C.F.R. §
412.108 (2010).
57. Critical Access Hospitals Payment Systems Payment Basics, supra note 54.
58. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.92, .108 (2010).
59. Census 2000 Population Statistics: U.S. Population Living in Urban vs. Rural Areas,
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census_issues/metropolitan_plan
ning/cps2k.cfm (last visited October 17, 2011); A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the
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So why worry about such a small percentage of spending if it is basically
serving another purpose as well, namely propping up rural economies and
their desirability as places to live? The short answer is because saving 10%
or 20% off of the 15% of Medicare’s total inpatient spending would
represent a large dollar amount of savings. In addition, some rural
hospitals are doing fine without the special payment rules, and for the
others, excess Medicare payments alone do not guarantee financial stability
or even survival for the smallest rural hospitals which are also threatened by
uneven management of care processes and cash flow, low volumes of
services, low payment from Medicaid and private providers, and
uncompensated care.60 Quality of care in small, low volume hospitals is
also a recurring concern.61 The better health policy would be to wean rural
hospitals off cost-based Medicare reimbursement, which will force the ones
which need help to form partnerships and referral arrangements with other
hospitals and management teams who can help them transition to a service
mix and business model that is sustainable, if possible. Then a separate set
of subsidy decisions should be made about ensuring an adequate degree of
access to acute care for rural Americans.62 These are complex and
ultimately social and political judgments, but the burden of keeping
inefficient rural hospitals afloat should not fall to the Medicare program, or
even to the overall health care system per se.
Another competition-promotion policy to consider is antitrust. The very
purpose of the antitrust laws, if not the intent of every set of antitrust
enforcers, is to protect and enhance consumer welfare from anti-competitive
actions of individual sellers or groups of sellers acting in concert, which
would lead to higher prices or lower quality than would occur under
unrestrained competitive pressures.63 Thus, the sin in antitrust is generally
some kind of restraint of trade or action which suppresses competition. In
practice in complex health markets, however, there has been relatively little
success in applying antitrust remedies wisely, as a recent review of case law
and scholarship shows:
Case law has constrained enforcers’ ability to control concentration and has
given overly permissive signals to providers who are contemplating further
Medicare Program, MEDPAC.GOV, 80 (June 2010), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/jun
10databookentirereport.pdf.
60. HOLMES, supra note 56, at 4, 20.
61. See AM. HOSP. ASSOC., THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR RURAL HOSPITALS IN
AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM 3, 7 (2010), available at www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/11aprtw-rural.pdf.
62. Having grown up in a town of 2,000 in a county of 10,000 in the Mississippi Delta, I
am highly sympathetic, personally.
63. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law
in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 185, 192.
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consolidation. Moreover, doctrine has developed erratically, failing to find
a coherent approach to analyzing the complex nature of health care
markets, and conveying the impression that decisions are more driven by
outcomes than by sound analysis of precedent and economic policy.64

There is nothing wrong with antitrust theory, but the truth is that basic
research into the empirical implications of imperfectly competitive and multiproduct health markets is sorely needed. This would give enforcers and
jurists the analytic support they need for judgments about the relative
likelihood of pro- or anti-competitive outcomes from joint ventures and
mergers that are rampant now, in some ways driven by the incentive
realignment strategies embedded in and emerging from the regulations
pursuant to the ACA. When antitrust law scholar Thomas Greaney writes:
“What antitrust needs most, however, is sound economic and policy
research,”65 then we must infer that antitrust policy cannot carry a heavy
burden in correcting widespread market imbalances in the next few years.
Even if we had first-rate analysis to rely on, the truth is that in many cases
the underlying source of local market power for some hospitals—and
sometimes for single specialty or large multi-specialty physician groups—
cannot be remedied effectively with traditional antitrust tools such as
stopping a merger or a divestiture order. This is because the hospital (or
physician group) is likely to either be a de facto monopoly (natural or not) or
have an outsized quality reputation, a form of product differentiation that is
impossible or difficult to calibrate and divest.
Antitrust policy, however, can be useful for very targeted, fact-driven
purposes. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Michigan
Attorney General recently filed a civil antitrust action against Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”) alleging that some of its “Most Favored
Nation” clauses in hospital contracts raise prices of consumers, by forcing
hospitals to charge up to 40% more to other insurers than BCBCM pays
them.66 Similarly, antitrust enforcement could be used to stop the anticompetitive practice of device manufacturers who prevent hospitals from
disclosing transaction prices to physicians.67 This has the effect of reducing

64. Id. at 193.
65. Id. at 194.
66. Complaint of United States of America and State of Michigan at 3, United States and
Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich.
2010) available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263235.pdf; see also Jeffrey
May, Health Insurer Sued Over Most Favored Nation Clauses, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS.
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://antitrustconnect.com/2010/10/19/health-insurer-sued-over-most-fav
ored-nation-clauses/.
67. Mark V. Pauly & Lawton R. Burns, Price Transparency For Medical Devices, 27 HEALTH
AFF. 1544, 1551-52 (2008).
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hospital bargaining power with device manufacturers, and clearly raises
costs and reduces ultimate consumer welfare.68
What are the most important other market imbalances, and what are
other possible competition-promoting remedies? The two cases mentioned
as candidates for targeted antitrust enforcement suggest the class of
imbalances, basically, whenever margins are large, whenever P is far above
C*. Insurers with dominant market shares, especially in the individual and
small group market, can earn very hefty margins, or, in more technical
terms, experience a low medical loss ratio (“MLR”) (percent of premium
dollars spent on covered medical services). The smaller the MLR, the more
likely profits or margins are large relative to premium revenue collected. A
recent survey reported that 27% of small group insurers and 46% of nongroup insurers have MLRs lower than required in 2011 by the ACA.69 The
difficulty is that competitive entry is not easy to engender in insurance
markets, given the inherent advantages incumbent firms have in contracting
with local providers. This is especially true if they have achieved large
market share and therefore bargaining power vis-a-vis hospitals (witness the
MFN example from BCBSM)70 and the simultaneous ability to pay physicians
high enough fees to discourage potential competitors from entry, which
benefits physicians and insurers but harms consumers and others in local
markets. This is exactly why so many analysts supported a carefully
structured public option health plan to jumpstart local insurance market
competition where there is little today.71
B.

Structured Competition, Countervailing Buying Power and Targeted
Regulation as Remedies

It is important to note, if only in passing, that no market activity is
possible without a governmental authority defining and enforcing property

68. Id. at 1545, 1552.
69. HEALTHSCAPE ADVISORS, LLC, MINIMUM MLR BENCHMARKING—HOW DOES YOUR PLAN
STACK UP?, available at http://gallery.mailchimp.com/351e723f2128c004676ac2dcf/files/
HSA_MLR_Benchmarking_Quick_Sheet.2.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2011); see also Sara
Hansard, 2010 Data Show Small Group, Individual Health Plans Would Have to Make
Rebates, Health Ins. Rep. (BNA) (May 4, 2011), available at http://www.healthscapeadvi
sors.com/articles/BNAMLRArticle.pdf.
70. May, supra note 66.
71. Competition in the Healthcare Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Prot., Product Safety, and Ins. of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
111th Cong. 85-99 (2009) (statement by Richard A. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Len M. Nichols, Director, Health Policy Program,
New America Foundation, David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action
Fund, Mark Riley, National Treasurer, National Community Pharmacists Association, and
Grace-Marie Turner, President, Galen Institute).
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rights and contracts. Thus, the idea of markets without government
altogether is a myth, however enduring and alluring it may be in some
ideological camps. Policy is about setting market rules so that the selfinterest of market players furthers the social interest of agreed upon policy
goals, as defined by politics. Structured competition then is not about
market manipulation, but about setting the rules of competition to move
market performance closer to the competitive ideal, P = C*. Remember,
sellers prefer P > C.
Alain Enthoven first articulated the idea of “managed competition.”72
He was among the first market analysts and advocates to recognize that
voluntary insurance markets as then (and currently) structured in the U.S.
were never going to be able to deliver affordable coverage for all
Americans.73 Assuming that affordable private insurance coverage for all is
indeed the policy goal we share,74 insurance market rules will have to be
changed so that aggressive underwriting and risk selection is no longer
profitable. This does not require putting insurers out of business or turning
them into regulated utilities (though the MLR regulation provisions in the
ACA come unnecessarily close to this result),75 but it does require changing
the rules so that their business models will have to change to remain
profitable. Guaranteed issue,76 modified or full community rating,77 the end
of pre-existing condition restrictions,78 an individual requirement to purchase
insurance plus subsidies for the low-income and risk adjustment to

72. Alain C. Enthoven, History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Jan.
1993 (Supp.), at 24, 29.
73. See id. at 42 (“A system of universal coverage will not work if everybody is covered,
but only those who voluntarily choose to do so pay for it. Such a system would be destroyed by
free riders.”).
74. This is the core issue, along with the metaphorical issue of competing theories of the
proper role for government, animating the political struggles over the passage and
implementation of the ACA.
75. See PHSA § 2718(a), added by ACA § 10101 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg18) (which requires insurers to submit a report including the percentage of total premium
revenue, after accounting for collection or receipts for risk adjustment, risk corridors, and
payments of reinsurance); see also Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio
(MLR) Requirements under the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864,
74,879, 74,886 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158).
76. See PHSA § 2702, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1)
(ensuring guaranteed availability of coverage); see also PHSA § 2703, added by ACA § 1201
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2) (ensuring guaranteed renewability of coverage).
77. See PHSA § 2701, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(ensuring modified community rating).
78. See PHSA § 2704(a), added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(prohibiting insurers from excluded applicants based on preexisting conditions).
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standardize the risk pools across insurers79 will largely accomplish the policy
goal. These new rules will channel or structure insurance market
competition to focus more on price and quality and less on socially
undesirable risk selection. If implemented wisely and with appropriate
subtlety, the ACA, which includes all of these conditions, should come close
to accomplishing this.
Other elements of structured competition in the ACA include
“administrative simplification.” Today, hospitals spend about 20% of
revenue and physicians’ offices spend 30% of revenue on the administrative
expense of getting paid,80 i.e., complying with the myriad claim forms and
rules that insurers enforce idiosyncratically to compete on paying the fewest
fraudulent claims. Fraud has to be checked, of course, but the ACA uses
federal regulation to set in motion a process of adopting standard claims
adjudication algorithms, so that clinicians and hospitals can spend more
resources on patient care.81 Competition over claims adjudication
algorithms, assuming the standard method is reasonably good at weeding
out fraudulent claims, is highly unproductive for the health care system as a
whole—even if it may be profitable for individual insurers, which is exactly
why they have always done it. A structured competition approach will
require all insurers to use the same algorithm, as the ACA does in 2016,
and thereby will help focus competition into more socially productive
avenues.82
New market competition rules, administrative simplification, and
medical loss ratio transparency83 will all usher in new insurer business
models that will focus on competing by helping all enrollees find value in
the health care system rather than by competing to exclude the largest share
of sick enrollees or denying the largest share of claims filed. Thus, insurers
will have to focus on avoiding full body scans, medical arms races, and
79. See ACA § 1501 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (The ACA enacted individual
mandate provision requiring most Americans to have health insurance coverage.); see also
ACA § 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36) (covering subsidies for low-income individuals.);
see also ACA § 1343 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 18063) (covering risk adjustment.).
80. See HEALTHCARE ADMIN. SIMPLIFICATION COAL. (HASC), BRINGING BETTER VALUE:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE COSTS AND CAUSES OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY IN THE
NATION’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 7 (2009), available at http://www.ahima.org/downloads/pdfs/
advocacy/HASCReport20090717.pdf (stating administrative costs account for an average of
35% of healthcare spending, including 27% of spending at physician offices and 21% at
hospitals.).
81. ACA § 1104 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2).
82. Id.
83. I would argue all that was necessary for good market results was for medical loss
ratio transparency, not the specific regulatory levels of MLR required by the ACA. However, it
is the law as it now stands and so while it is overkill, the same result I focus on here will likely
occur.
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other volume-enhancing strategies of the past. Insurers will also find it in
their interest to pro-actively move away from unaccountable fee-for-service
provider payment systems—and indeed, they already are.84 Thus structured
competition in insurance markets will likely lead to more effective
countervailing buying power in health service markets.
But will private insurers have enough clout to counter provider market
power at the local level? They, and many commentators, fear not.85 This is
why I and others think Medicare has to play a catalytic and collaborative
role in exercising countervailing market power. Only Medicare has sufficient
market share to make it worthwhile for providers to change their business
models from health service maximization to health promotion and
coordinating care.86 Insurers can help immensely by continuing valuebased design research, for value-based cost-sharing can align
consumer/patient interests with payer and provider interests in an efficient
and high-quality health care system.87
Still, no one really thinks that even all of this will be enough to shift our
health care cost growth trajectories to a sustainable slope soon enough to
avoid much more fiscal and economic stress of the sort our national
politicians have been arguing about lately. In short, we have to pay China
back for all the borrowing we have done,88 and that will require a cohesive

84. See, e.g., Michael E. Chernew et al., Private Payer Innovation in Massachusetts: The
‘Alternative Quality Contract,’ 30 HEALTH AFF. 51, 51-52, 61 (2011) (discussing Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Massachusetts’s move from fee-for-service payment to an “Alternate Quality
Contract,” which is modified global payment system); see also John E. Kralewski et al., The
Effects of Medical Group Practice and Physician Payment Methods on Costs of Care, 35
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 591, 608 (2000) (demonstrating how capitation payments are
associated with lower costs to patients).
85. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 700-05 (2010) (discussing providers’
increasing market power to negotiate higher payment rates from private insurers in
California); PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF
No. 16, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF PROVIDER
MARKET POWER, at 1, 1–2 (Nov. 2010).
86. Richard Kronick, Understanding the Medicare Financing Problem, in MAKING
MEDICARE SUSTAINABLE 7 , 17–18 (Len M. Nichols & Robert A. Berenson, eds. 2009).
87. See A. Mark Fendrick & Michael E. Chernew, Value-based Insurance Design: Aligning
Incentives to Bridge the Divide Between Quality Improvement and Cost Containment, 12 AM.
J. MANAGED CARE (SPECIAL ISSUE) SP5, SP5 (2006) (stating value-based design insurance allows
a focus on value of services, not cost or quality alone); see also Michael Chernew & A. Mark
Fendrick, Value and Increased Cost Sharing in the American Health Care System, 43 HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 451, 452 (2008) (noting that an ideal system would target copayments not
based on the value of services, but patient groups who receive the value of services).
88. See Major Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt (last
updated Nov. 16, 2011) (showing China is the top holder of American treasury securities).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

24

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 5:7

and aggressive strategy of all of the above plus collaboration where
necessary and feasible.
C. Collaboration
When is collaboration preferred to competition, even by economists?
When no one knows the best way or technique, when there are large social
payoffs from figuring it out quickly, and when the gains from collaboration
are likely to greatly outweigh the net gains from competition. Clearly,
despite the incentive realignments created by the ACA and the related
innovations spawned by the ACA in the private sector, no one really knows
how to write down the math of the transition and the new business models
for every stakeholder in the health care system today. The scale of the
necessary investments dwarfs the resources of most individual organizations.
Investments are necessary in: (1) contracting expertise and templates for
all actors in the health care system, from physician practices large and small
to hospitals of all kinds; (2) measuring development for much larger units of
services (many fewer than 8,000 CPT codes) and for the quality of those
bundled services, (3) creating transparent databases that can support
incentive realignment and efficient contracting, like all payer claims
databases, health information exchanges of interoperable clinical data, and
the specific elements of the medical loss ratio; (4) supporting consumer
engagement strategies, including: wellness programs that motivate, value
based insurance designs, and decision support systems that channel patient
self-interest in an efficient and sustainable health care system to align with
payer and provider interest; and (5) developing supple antitrust safe harbors
that are also checks on excess market power so that optimal joint venture
and accountability/reward sharing arrangements are worked out and
spread.
Collaboration and sharing come most naturally among entities that do
not compete locally. Since medicine is a profession with standards that are
expected of all practitioners, standards that are constantly rising, the clinical
medical literature is based on the premise that knowledge that advances
patient outcomes and safety is a public good and should be shared so all
clinicians and patients may benefit from it, not just the patients of the doctor
that discovered the new modality. The rewards that go with recognition for
the discovery are presumed to be sufficient to preclude the need to hide the
knowledge and be the only practitioner who performs the technique. The
collaborative investments outlined above may confer temporary competitive
advantage to some stakeholders if they were successful alone, but our
national sense of urgency to rein in health care cost growth is sufficiently
great, and the likelihood of anyone squaring any of those circles quickly on
their own is so low, that collaboration among public and private
stakeholders is paramount at the present moment. In many ways, this is the
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effort that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within CMS is
trying to lead, but it is only going to succeed if a critical mass of private
sector entities—hospitals, physicians, and health plans—embrace and
engage in the collaborations and experiments needed.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has outlined a set of positive roles for government policy to
play in transforming the U.S. health care system. It identifies clear cases in
which, compared to the pre-ACA status quo, laisseiz-faire, regulation and
collaboration are likely to substantially improve the performance of health
service and insurance markets. The ACA itself provides many tools that will
clearly be helpful in creating a sustainable health system that serves almost
all Americans better than they are served today. At the same time, the
complexities of incentive realignment are so great and our need for cost
growth reduction so profound, that collaboration among public and private
decision makers will be necessary as well, since the incentives that must be
realigned must work for all payers, clinicians, and patients. With the proper
spirit of collaboration and investments, our health care system could serve
all Americans and become sustainable within ten years. This would satisfy
both a moral and an economic imperative. My contention in this article is
that a wiser application of a broad set of economic policy tools can help us
accomplish this common purpose. The urgency of our task is such that we
should, to the extent possible, dispense with political distractions and
intensify this quest to the highest possible extent.
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